Abstract-Cyber security has become a major challenge when detecting and preventing attacks on any self-organizing network. Defining a trust and reputation mechanism is a required feature in these networks to assess whether the alerts shared by their Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) actually report a true incident. This paper presents a way of measuring the trustworthiness of the alerts issued by the IDSs of a collaborative intrusion detection network, considering the detection skills configured in each IDS to calculate the satisfaction on each interaction (alert sharing) and, consequently, to update the reputation of the alert issuer. Without alert satisfaction, collaborative attack detection cannot be a reality in front of ill-intended IDSs. Conducted experiments demonstrate a better accuracy when detecting attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kinetic attacks have been a constant concern in the history of human societies, this being shifted to the current cybernetic era due to the emergence of computational technologies such as the Internet [1] . Traditional kinetic warfare has accordingly become into the area of cyber warfare, taking cyber security a new dimension that must be addressed adequately [2] . Even Joseph Demarest, assistant director in the cyber division at FBI, recently stated this new major challenge before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism [3] . He went on to say that "cyber criminal threats pose very real risks to the economic security and privacy," estimating losses over $110 billion around the world. Fig. 1 illustrates a brief overview of the main challenges to be addressed in the cyber security space, which are grouped around the four self-* capabilities of any autonomous system that have to be applied in self-organizing networks (SON) [4] .
A. Motivation
Cyber security entails a number of challenges, as shown in Fig. 1 , with a common base: the detection of threats occurring in the target system (e.g., attacks or security incidents, among others). These threats can be detected by using well-known tools, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). In this sense, correlation is a required feature to reach a holistic view and a better situational awareness of cyber threats [5] .
One of the main problems in correlating security incidents is that current collaborative intrusion detection systems assume that IDSs cooperate each other honestly. That is to say, alerting when a threat occurs, or not alerting, indicating that the system is in a steady state. Yet, this presumption in honesty may lead the system toward a misleading perception on its security state in case the IDSs exhibit a malicious behavior, reporting bogus alerts to provoke detection errors to the rest of IDSs.
An effective way of identifying malicious attitudes consists of making use of reputation-based trust mechanisms to model the behavior of any entity. However, very well-known systems, such as EigenTrust [6] and PeerTrust [7] , focused on generic scenarios, without considering the particular features of the final scenario of application. In the case of intrusion detection, some solutions, such as Indra [8] and ABDIAS [9] , began to recognize the importance of managing the trust in their systems to detect malicious behaviors, when their IDSs shared potential alerts among them [10] . Despite this recognition, none of these works offered a solution to such management.
In recent years, a few works surfaced proposing ways in attack detection of assessing the trustworthiness of IDSs, such as [11] and [12] . However, these works presented an important and common drawback. They supposed a total homogeneity in the detection skills of each IDS, so conjecturing that all the IDSs were configured to detect the same sort of incidents. Yet, the current heterogeneity in configuration implies a need to assess the satisfaction over any alert shared by a given IDS. Therefore, satisfaction is a key concept in trust and reputation management systems, where detection skills are a required parameter with which a trustor (alerts receptor) can decide whether a trustee (alerts issuer) exhibited a good or bad behavior, i.e., whether the IDS had an honest or malicious attitude, respectively. When evaluating an alert, the satisfaction is only possible when IDSs (issuer and receptor) are configured with the required detection skills to produce the alert.
B. Our contribution
We consider as a basic work the proposal presented in [11] , developing in this paper a redefinition of several of the concepts related to trust that were proposed there. In this sense, we present below a novel mechanism applicable to a given collaborative intrusion detection network, with which to assess whether the alerts shared by its IDSs are or not true (they represent actual incidents occurred in the system).
In order to compute the satisfaction on the alerts, our model takes into consideration the functionality and detection skills implemented by the IDSs, in order to provide a better or worse update to the reputation score of the alerts issuer.
S e l f -o p t i m i z a t i o n
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C. Paper structure
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The main related work is outlined in Section II, whereas Section III presents the proposed trust-based approach when measuring the satisfaction on incidents produced within a collaborative intrusion detection network. For evaluation purposes of our proposal, Section IV reports some experimental results on its effectiveness and accuracy. Finally, Section V summarizes our contributions and draws future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
The work presented in [13] was one of the pioneer solutions in addressing trust management in intrusion detection systems. In this work, each IDS i has a list of acquaintance peers with whom it interacted in a P2P-based overlay for detecting attacks. The trust computation on each acquaintance IDS j , which is given by (1) , is measured by comparing the number of successful (s j ) and unsuccessful (u j ) experiences; that is, if both IDSs behaved in the same way or not when generating the corresponding alert. In (1), δ indicates a minimum number of n interactions (alerts) between IDS i and IDS j .
Notwithstanding, [13] presented a number of considerable drawbacks. First, the trust computation for each pair of IDSs only considers direct experiences between them, ignoring what the rest of IDSs think about the behavior of the IDS being evaluated: indirect experiences. Secondly, this work did not take into consideration the detection skills of any IDS, so that a given IDS cannot measure the behavior of any other if both are configured for monitoring neither the same sources nor the same security policies (i.e., the number of unsuccessful experiences will always grow after analyzing each alert).
Many works in the current literature propose some models in a similar way as [13] does. The vast majority focused on the trust management in wireless sensor networks like TSRF [14] , with the only concern in detecting malicious behaviors when exchanging routing tables and updates. Furthermore, they did not consider the particular features when detecting attacks, therefore being generic solutions in their application domain. Compared to [13] , the latter works only contribute, regarding trust management, in the use of indirect experiences.
It is worth noticing that recent works are addressing trust and reputation management in collaborative intrusion detection systems, such as [15] and [12] , although with some limitations. They were only focused on the HIDSs' behavior for detecting viruses, setting aside the features of the NIDSs in analyzing the network traffic. The trust computation was performed by each HIDS i on all its geographically close neighbors, updated by (2) depending on the n opinions gathered from each HIDS j of the i's acquaintance list during a time range t k .
where S j,i k ∈ [0, 1] is the satisfaction for i on the k-th opinion gathered from j, n is the total number of opinions sent by j, and F is a forgetting factor to exponentially assign a minor weight to the oldest opinions with respect to the recent ones. All partial trust values on j are aggregated by i with a weighting method based on the physical distance between the HIDSs. However, the physical proximity of NIDSs cannot be considered as a factor, since the detection between two nearby NIDSs will only be possible if they monitor the same sources.
The challenging issue in (2) was to compute the satisfaction that an HIDS i can deposit on the k-th opinion sent by HIDS j (S j,i k ). This was proposed in [16] by using (3) .
where r defines the received answer based on its distance to the expected answer a and the difficulty d of the test message about the alerts analyzed, with r, a, d ∈ [0, 1]; and c 1 and c 2 are two parameters to control the extent of penalty for wrong estimates and the satisfaction sensitivity, respectively.
In addition to the drawbacks introduced earlier, these works did not consider the trust that a given HIDS must have on the opinions gathered from others within its community. Because of this, malicious HIDSs sending out bogus opinions may lead benevolent ones to get incorrect values to compute trust scores.
The work presented in [11] appeared to fix the drawbacks commented before. The authors proposed a trust and reputation system to improve the detection coverage of a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network (CIDN), discarding bogus alerts shared by malicious IDSs. This work considered direct and indirect experiences to model the behavior of both HIDSs and NIDSs, defining the satisfaction score through a defuzzified value δ j ∈ [0, 1] of the fuzzy set associated with the severity of the alert sent by the j-th IDS. This satisfaction is computed in (4), where λ j ∈ [−1, 1] is the certainty of IDS k with regard to the truthfulness of the alert shared by IDS j.
Despite the work done in [11] , the certainty λ j to compute the satisfaction level on an alert was postponed to be conducted as future work. For simplicity, the authors defined a fix value of the certainty (λ j = 0.5) for experimental purposes. Moreover, as commented earlier, none of the works presented throughout this section provided a way to assess alert satisfaction, making use of the detection skills supported by the IDSs.
III. TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
This section presents the trust and reputation management system we propose, in order to accurately determine whether an alert shared by an IDS represents or not a true evidence of a threat occurred at the target system. Every IDS (either an HIDS or an NIDS) will be strategically deployed within a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network (CIDN), following a partially-decentralized system schema, aimed at detecting distributed attacks, as proposed in [11] .
A. Functionality, detection skills and allocation of an IDS
Once a given IDS (NIDS or HIDS) receives a new alert from another IDS, the former has to assess if the alert sent by the latter represents or not a true incident; that is, is it a consequence of an actual threat occurred at the target system? This assessment depends on the configuration applied both to the alerts receptor (trustor) and the alerts issuer (trustee).
The process regarding the assessment of an alert could only be possible when the two IDSs are located in the same network segment (allocation) and they are internally implemented to detect the same type of attack class (functionality and detection skills) [17] . TABLE I gives a brief overview of the possible properties that an IDS can maintain as configuration. 
given configuration c i ∈ C, is composed of three elements:
Each a j of this set represents a network segment where the j-th IDS can be deployed, which is identified by an IP address and a subnet mask like 10.0.68.0/24, for example.
• Functionality:
of this vector indicates whether that functionality f j is a given role of the IDS.
• Detection skills:
. This is a vector where each ds j ∈ [0, 1] is the percentage of the security policies required to cope with a generic capability, each being oriented to detect a certain type of attack class. These policies can be signature-based detection rules (misuse detection) or policies modeling the normal system behavior (anomaly detection), for example. Note that a fine-tuned representation of each detection skill is outside the scope of this paper.
As a straightforward example, consider a CIDN with two IDSs that can have the properties shown in In this use case, let us suppose that NIDS 2 receives an alert from NIDS 1 indicating a potential incident at the target system, which can be detected by an ANN technique. However, NIDS 2 may not have clear evidence about that incident as both are allocated in different places. The network packets causing the incident could have being routed through different physical links. Thus, the assessment process of the NIDS 1 's trustworthiness may not be performed by NIDS 2 , not being able to evaluate if the alert is or not a true incident.
Consider now that the two NIDSs are deployed in the same network segment and NIDS 1 receives an alert from NIDS 2 , by using the SVM technique implemented by the latter. Despite sharing the same allocation, NIDS 1 will not be able to carry out the assessment of the NIDS 2 's trustworthiness, since NIDS 1 is not capable of directly evaluating alerts of NIDS 2 regarding a detection skill that does not support.
In the two cases reported earlier, the trustee's reputation (alerts issuer) should not be updated considering it had a bad (malicious) behavior, as the trustor (alerts receptor) could not have had actual evidences to assess the alert. In this sense, it is obvious that the properties defined in TABLE I are required to be considered when assessing alert satisfaction.
B. Collaborative intrusion detection network
The deployment phase of the IDSs can follow a number of well-known schemes, such as centralized, fully decentralized, or partially-decentralized [18] . We adapt here the partiallydecentralized system architecture proposed in [11] , including the properties of Section III-A to assess alert satisfaction. Fig. 2 shows an example with seven IDSs deployed within two network segments of a CIDN, defining for each IDS its own functionality and detection skills. So, we strengthen the work proposed in [11] by sharing the configuration of any IDS i (3-tuple <A i , F i , DS i >) to improve accuracy rates when detecting attacks. Each IDS i will send its configuration through a Publication Service (PS) in its bootstrapping phase, which will be maintained by the rest of IDSs internally. Once an alert is produced by an IDS, such an IDS sends it to the Wise Committee (WC) through the Publication Service (PS) for evaluation purposes. That WC, composed of the most trustworthy IDSs deployed in the CIDN, is defined as a proxy element between all the IDSs to assess their alerts before they are finally published to the rest of IDSs.
Among all the WC members, the most trustworthy one is chosen for being the head or leader, denoted as Wise Committee Leader (WCL). This supernode is in charge of aggregating the recommendations (indirect experiences) requested to all IDSs of the CIDN, except the IDS being evaluated, and finally computing the reputation on the alerts issuer to decide whether publishing or not that alert to the entire CIDN.
Note that the WCL is also capable of sharing the previous intra-domain knowledge to other CIDNs, thereby building an inter-domain knowledge to detect distributed attacks. However, this inter-domain scenario is outside the scope of this paper.
C. Truthfulness of the alerts issuer according to satisfaction
As stated in Section III-B, the PS notifies the WCL once an alert tries to be published by an IDS j. The WC members have to compute the j's reputation, Rep(j), to decide if the alert is a true or false positive depending on that reputation score. Note that all alerts will later be published to all CIDN's IDSs, but adding the decision taken by the WC. To this end, the WCL only queries recommendations to the IDSs with which j shares similar detection abilities (as we will see later); otherwise, the IDSs could not know the satisfaction on the alerts issued by j. These recommendations are finally aggregated and shared by the WCL with the rest of the WC members, where each W C i will assess its trust on j, T W Ci (j) ∈ [0, 1], as given in (5) .
where |IDS| is the total number of IDSs in the CIDN; defines an aggregation operation chosen by the administrator like average, maximum, or minimum;
defines the recommendation value gathered from k on j; ϕ ≥ 1 represents the pace at which W C i "forgets" recommendations; and ω i,k ∈ [0, 1] is the weight that W C i can deposit on the type of IDS that k represents. For example, ω i,k may be divided into separate three weights according to the k's group: α i for NIDSs, β i for HIDSs, and ϕ i for the WC's NIDSs, such as proposed in [11] , with α i + β i + γ i = 1.
Eq. (5) is based on the one proposed in [11] , but redefining it to consider the reputation that a given W C i has on each IDS k queried for recommendation. Without such a reputation, as [11] does, recommendations provided by IDSs will have the same importance, not considering that they could come from IDSs with a low reputation -indicating a malicious behavior. Due to this fact, (5) includes the IDSs' reputation score to take into account a given pace to forget recommendations according to the reputation diminishing. Note that the value of ϕ is chosen by the administrator to diminish the recommendation importance more or less quickly with regards to the reputation of the recommendation provider.
As defined in (5), the recommendation component Rec k (j) supposes the most important factor to assess alert satisfaction. In this sense, the recommendation of IDS k about IDS j at a given time t is computed by (6) , taking into consideration the previous recommendation values already computed by k.
where υ k ∈ [0, 1] is the weight to previous recommendation values and Sat k (j) ∈ [0, 1] represents the satisfaction of IDS k on the alert published by j, according to the configurations declared by IDSs k and j in their bootstrapping phase.
The alert satisfaction Sat k (j), included in (6), may vary by several factors, as discussed in Section III-A and thoroughly analyzed below. This satisfaction depends on whether IDS k has direct or indirect evidences about the alerts published by IDS j. The configuration of both IDSs (3-tuple <A, F, DS>) should come into play to determine such possible evidence.
1) Satisfaction when IDSs are in the same allocation:
The allocation is a key factor when assessing alert satisfaction. Then, if a j = a k , where a j , a k ∈ A identify the allocation (network segment) of IDSs j and k, respectively, the incident causing the alert shared by j would also have been detected by k, provided that the two IDSs are implementing similar functionality and detection skills (as declared by them in their configuration). In case k has produced an alert to warn about the same incident, the satisfaction of k about j should have the maximum possible value according to the j's reputation (from the perspective of k) and the alert severity: Sat k (j) = δ j ; that is, the defuzzified value shown in (4) -defined in [11] .
2) IDSs deployed in the same allocation, but with different configurations to alert the same incident:
If IDS k did not generate the alert, although it is deployed in the same network segment than j (alert issuer), k would have to infer the possible functionality and detection skill that j used to produce the alert. Under this uncertainty paradigm, k can base its decision on the detection abilities of other IDSs in its same network segment and their attitude with respect to the alert produced by IDS j (i.e., following an indirect experience-based approach).
Specifically, k would have to check which configurations (vectors F and DS) implement the IDSs that also generated an alert like the one produced by j. To this end, let us suppose that ϑ k (j) ≥ 0 defines the detection competences of the IDSs that alerted about the incident detected by j, all deployed in the same network segment than k; and θ k (j) ≥ 0 represents the ones related to the other IDSs that did not alert. The alert satisfaction under this uncertainty paradigm is given by (7), where δ j refers again to the defuzzified value used in (4).
As shown, the alert satisfaction is actually a majority-based voting scheme, where ϑ k (j) and θ k (j) should have a relevant meaning according to i) the configurations implemented by the other IDSs that detected (set ϑ) or not (set θ) the same incident than j, in comparison with the configuration of k; and ii) the reputation score of each of those IDSs. As ϑ k (j) and θ k (j) have the same meaning, only varying the set to which the IDSs make reference, we only define below how to compute ϑ k (j). In this sense, ϑ k (j) ≥ 0 can be computed as defined in (8), where it considers the detection competences that k and the IDSs alerting the same incident detected by j have in common.
where v is the number of IDSs that alerted as well as j did, μ k (i) determines the similarity in detection ability that IDSs k and i have in common, and Rep k (i) is the reputation score of i from the perspective of k. That reputation score will be included in (8) to give more importance to the fact of detecting an incident to those IDSs with higher reputation scores.
As defined in (8), μ k (i) is required to identify the similarity between k and i for computing their common capabilities in detection, in order to know whether a given alert should have been detected by the two IDSs. In case both IDSs do not share any competence to detect attacks, the satisfaction on the alerts generated by one of them will never be able to be calculated by the other. This similarity computation is given by (9) .
where is an exclusive disjunction operator, i.e., an XOR, reporting true (value of 1) whenever both functionalities differ, so that (1 − f s (k) f s (i)) will give us an XNOR-based result of 1 indicating that both functionalities are implemented by k and i. Instead, the right part of (9) computes an average value of the similarity in detection between both IDSs.
As noted at the beginning of Section III-C, the WCL will only ask for recommendations to the IDSs able to detect the same incidents than the ones alerted by j (i.e., IDSs sharing similar detection abilities with j with a sufficient reputation score). This similarity in the detection processes between IDSs is defined in (9) , where k should be taken as the WCL itself.
3) Satisfaction when IDSs are deployed in separate network segments:
If a j = a k , there is no actual obligation on k to alert about the incident detected by j. Yet, it is possible that k had to detect it in case a number of its neighbors in a k did detect it. The alleged false negative produced by k could be due to a temporal failure in its detection processes, for example. In this case, k should only compute the new recommendation value of IDS j, as defined in (6), if and only if ϑ k (j) ≥ σ a k , where σ a k is a threshold value set by the administrator indicating that k should compute ϑ k (j) when there is a minimum number of neighbors in its same allocation, with a sufficient reputation score, which are alerting about the incident detected by j.
As final step in computing Rep(j), as [11] also does, the reputation on IDS j is computed by aggregating all partial trust values given by (5), calculated by every W C i . This aggregation process is carried out by the WCL through computing (10) .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS This section presents some experimental results conducted on a simulated CIDN to assess how alert satisfaction helps in detecting attacks as the number of malicious entities increases.
We maintained the same experimental setting used in [11] with the purpose of comparing as much as possible that work and the extension proposed in this paper with alert satisfaction support. Therefore, the simulated CIDN was built deploying 300 HIDSs (host-based detection functionality) and 200 NIDSs (network-based detection functionality), with |W C| ∈ [10, 20] . To compute the truthfulness on every IDS, as given in (5), we set the same weights used in [11] for the recommendations that could be provided by the three types of CIDN members: α = 0.4 (WC), β = 0.35 (NIDSs), and γ = 0.25 (HIDSs). Within this environment, we injected 9000 alerts according to the four categories of severity levels defined by IDMEF in [19] , including a random number of false positives to simulate bad behaviors exhibited by malicious IDSs.
A. Experiment 1: Detection coverage when considering IDSs with the same detection abilities
The purpose behind this experiment is to compare the trust computation presented in [11] and its redefinition proposed in this paper in (5) . To this end, we set ϕ = 2 to indicate a "soft pace" at which W C i forgets recommendations. Furthermore, we maintained the four percentages used in [11] to establish the number of malicious IDSs deployed in the CIDN: 20, 40, 60, and 80 %. The outcomes are depicted in TABLE II.
It is worth noting that we do not yet introduce the concept of alert satisfaction to assess a given alert, but measuring how the trust computation firstly proposed in [11] can be enhanced by making use of the redefinition defined in (5). This table shows the percentages on average from three of the four severity levels defined in IDMEF: Low, Medium, and High. We did not take into consideration the alerts with an Info severity level as they do not carry critical information about the proper operation of the CIDN.
Percentage of malicious IDSs
As observed in TABLE II, the redefinition proposed in this paper regarding the trust computation -Eq. (5)-shows a little worse outcomes (over 10,78 % on average) than those obtained in [11] when assessing benevolent alerts. However, (5) raises better results (over 39,08 % improvement) when assessing the alerts generated by malicious IDSs, which we consider more important to get a better and accurate detection coverage to find out attacks after discarding bogus alerts.
B. Experiment 2: Detection coverage with IDSs implementing heterogeneous detection abilities in configuration
This second experiment is intended to measure how the trust and reputation mechanism with alert satisfaction proposed in this paper behaves when the percentage of malicious IDSs increases gradually. The inclusion in the IDSs of the allocation, functionality, and detection skill concepts will be crucial to assess the alerts they generate. Therefore, we cannot compare in this experiment the solution proposed in this paper and the one presented in [11] , since the latter does not support any of these concepts for assessing alert satisfaction.
In this experiment, all the IDSs were uniformly deployed in 25 network segments, so that each one had 20 IDSs at its disposal for detection purposes, and the 200 NIDSs and the 300 HIDSs were configured with the network-based detection or the host-based detection functionality, respectively, with two random detection skills for each IDS. Regarding the number of malicious IDSs in the CIDN, we considered in this experiment that such a number could vary between 5, 10, 15, and 20 %. We did not follow the same distribution of malicious IDSs than the previous experiment, because the majority-based voting scheme proposed in Section III-C2 would make that malicious IDSs prevail in front the benevolent ones around 50 %, where the latter ones will be incorrectly accused of misbehaving by the weight of the majority (the malicious ones). Moreover, we believe that 100 IDSs with an ill-intended behavior of a total of 500 (20 % of the total of IDSs) would not reflect a possible situation in a real scenario. The CIDN administrators should be reported by our trust and reputation mechanism when the number of bogus alerts are being gradually identified.
The outcomes obtained for this experiment are graphically shown in Fig. 4 containing two column charts, both of them representing the total in percentage of the alerts published and unpublished by benevolent or malicious IDSs: the chart on the left for the HIDSs, and on the right one for the NIDSs. At a first glance, we can observe that the number of malicious IDSs does not fit neatly into the number of published alerts. This fact is mainly due to the detection abilities (3-tuple <A, F, DS>) have been configured in the IDSs randomly, in contrast to the total homogeneity in detection present in [11] for all the IDS deployed in the CIDN. The loss in the detection processes makes to attenuate the performance in assessing a given alert. However, Fig. 4 shows promising results with which we can assert that our trust and reputation mechanism with alert satisfaction can detect malicious behaviors, although they reach 10-15 % of the total of malicious IDSs.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As main part of the new cyber security dimension, we propose in this paper a trust and reputation mechanism with alert satisfaction support to assess whether the alerts generated by the IDSs within a collaborative intrusion detection network represent true incidents, or they was produced by IDSs with a malicious behavior. This mechanism considers the detection competences of each IDS as well as its reputation to compute the satisfaction on alerts. As future work, this can be extended in a number of ways. At least, a fine-tuned representation of the detection competences are required, since this paper only shapes them as generic capabilities. These competences is a key factor that needs to be studied thoroughly. 
